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OBITER DICTA
"An obiter dictum, in the language of the law, is a gratuitous opinion, an individual impertinence, which, whether it be wise or foolish, right or wrong,
bindeth none-not even the lips that utter it."*

"lan

The Animal Kingdom
is a rope stretched between the animal and the Superman ....
.
Nietzsche, Thus Spake Zarathustra, Prologue, Chap. 4.

lan, himself by definition part animal, has from time immemorial, been closely
concerned with those lower in the echelon of creation. He works them, plays with
them, hunts and eats them. Occasionally he is hunted and eaten by them. It is not
surprising then that that noble product of man's rationality, the law, touching as it does
upon every aspect of his life, is frequently concerned with animals. In this respect we
shall comment briefly, but first a definition of terms is desirable.
According to Commonwealth v. Turner, 145 Mlass. 205, 300, 14 N.E. 130 (18S7),
'Animal' in its common acception includes all irrational creatures. . . . " This
definition however, is a bit too broad. It would autoWho goes there?
matically include most of your wife's relatives and your
great aunt Matilda. On the other extreme is Brooks v.
Moore, 13 B.C. 91 (1907), which solemnly remarks the obvious by stating that the
term "animal" includes a horse. Such an opinion would be disputed only by the most
partisan members of the baggy tweed and eau de Man 0' War set. The best definition
would seem to lie between the two. We shall proceed now to an examination of the
case law and legislation on the subject.
In Baker v. Snell, 2 K.B. 352, 354 (1908), defendant's servant, charged with the
keeping of defendant's dog, which was known to be vicious, released it in the midst of
a number of other servants, saying at the time, "I'll bet the
Famous Last Words
dog will not bite anyone. . . . Go it Bob!" Whereupon
the dog bit the plaintiff. Defendant's big mistake was in
hiring such person in the first place. He undoubtedly was a member of a distinct
breed easily recognized by its propensity for attempting to fill inside straights, loudly
proclaiming that they were on the boxing team at Upton Pompton Junior High and
can lick any man in the house, and quoting the Reader's Digest to convince their
doctor his diagnosis is incorrect. The latter gambit often takes the form of quoting
their wife's brother to their lawyer for similar reasons.
Incidentally, mastiffs, hounds, spaniels and tumblers were, at one time, the only dogs
in which the common law recognized a property. Ireland v. Higgins, Cro. Eliz. 125, 78
Eng. Rep. 383. The case would never be so decided today.
Man's Best Friend
It would arouse great indignation by making mutts out of
Rin Tin Tin and Lassie, and put out of business all those
people who make a living by yearly convincing thousands that they ought to pay
seventy-five dollars more and get the pure bred Humpherton-Wowser with the nerves
of a communist at a Holy Name rally, instead of the happy little pooch whose left ear
is a millimeter out of line.
* Birrell, Obiter Dicta (185) title page.
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Interesting is Lynn v. State, 33 Texas Crim. 153, 25 S.W. 779 (1894). It lays down
a dog is justifiable. This case however, must be
the rule that homicide in defense
limited ofstrictly
to its facts. It cannot be extended to indude headwaiters, the boss's nephew or your wife's brother.
Dog's Best Friend
Those who defend such people deserve to have the book
thrown at them. The courts have gone along with the great tide of popular sentiment
and refused to apply the rule of Lynn v. State in such cases.
In Scribner v. Kelley, 38 Barb. (N.Y.) 14 (1862), it was held that the strange appearance of an elephant causing plaintiff's horse to become unruly, was not such an act
of the elephant as to render its keeper liable without showing that such was the effect on horses generally, and that
The Night is Young
And You're so Beautiful the keeper knew thereof. This case would appear sound.
The elephant was probably not overly impressed by the
horse's looks either, and certainly the poor pachyderm, as opposed to modem women,
cannot be blamed for his appearance. Nowhere in the facts does it state that the
elephant employed lipstick, powder, rouge, cream, mascara, henna or any such camouflage; he just stood there as God had created him and the silly horse bolted. If the
horse was frightened, it must be remembered that the elephant's feelings were probably
hurt; after all he is thought quite attractive by others of his kind, which is attested
by the fact that elephants, in one form or another, have been around for a million or
so years.
We conclude our survey of the case law with Copley v. Wills, (Texas Civ. App.) 152
S.W. 839 (1913). Here, a boy gave peanuts to a monkey running at large in a museum.
When he stopped to pick up a peanut the monkey had
Do Not Feed
dropped, the ungrateful primate bit him. The boy was
The Animals
held not responsible for the attack. This is a shocking
case. It could never have happened in New York. In the
Metropolitan Museum, all monkeys running at large are dressed in elaborate suits of
fifteenth century armor. Feeding them peanuts is strictly forbidden and it is impossible
for them to bite since the visors on their helmets must be kept closed at all times.
Secondly, a New Yorker would never think of picking up a peanut dropped by a
monkey. Fresh from battling his fellow humans on the subway, his attitude is almost
universally to the effect that the monkey can bloody well pick up his own peanuts. The
case, however, can be said to be the rule in Texas, where the men are polite, the monkeys
ungrateful, and the museums must really be something.
We turn now to a consideration of legislation in respect to animals. The field is so broad
that we shall limit ourselves to two representative samples enacted recently in New
York.
Chapter 306 of the New York Session Laws of 1956 amends section 273 of the Conservation Law to prevent the taking of aquatic insects without a license. To those
accustomed to the necessity of procuring a license to take
The Macomber Affair lion in Kenya, Kodiak bear in Alaska and tiger in Hyderabad, it will take time to get used to the idea that license is now required to take a
waterbug in New York. But time can accustom men to many things and the day may
yet come when the late movie on television will contain the following typical scene
from a British importation: The setting is a popular men's bar in Nairobi. Peter
Frothingham, white hunter, is seated alone nursing a scotch and splash and examining
the bolt from his Mannlicher-Schoenauer when he is approached by one of his oldest
friends, Sir Phamesworth Hyphen-Smith:
"Mind if I join you Peter?"
"Not at all old boy. I say Smitty, you look a bit shakey."
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"Just in. Number One boy badly mauled. Sticky business."
"Water-buffalo?"
"Aquatic insect."
"Bad show old boy, bloody shame."
"Ironic thing that. Wasn't out for acquatic insect. Ruddy creature attacked us. Puts
me one over my license. Have to explain to the commissioner."
"He'll understand."
Subdivision 2 of section 252 of the Conservation Law as amended by chapter 183
of the New York Session Laws of 1956, provides for an
Status Quo
open season on mink. As far as the ladies are concerned,
as the husbands well know, this statute merely codifies the common law.

